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LYDIA PATTON 
30.1 INTRODUCTION 
........................................................................................................................................ ... 
A classic debate over the difference in methodology between the Geistes- and the 
Naturwissenschaften, usually translated as the human and the natural sciences, took 
place between Wilhelm Dilthey and Wilhelm Windclband in the late nineteenth century. 
The debate between Dilthey and Windclband does not turn on the same questions as do 
post-nin eteenth-century discussions that are more widely known. Instead, the Dilthey-
Windelband debate has its roots in upheavals in German university and research prac-
tices at the beginning of the nineteenth century . The debate, and the nineteenth century 
discussions more generally, certainly are relevant to discussions of whether true science 
has a necessarily a priori or law-governed (nomothetic) core. But they are also relevant to 
the question of how to construct research programs that involve cooperation between sci-
ences, and to broader questi ons of interpretation and understanding in theory assessment. 
30.2 THE NINETEENTH CENTURY CONTEXT 
Perhaps the most familiar context in which philosophers are used to viewing the debate 
over the independen ce of the human sciences is the defense , by Heidegger and Gadamc r, 
of the inde pendence of their hermeneutic theories from the logical positivist thesis of the 
unity of science. The debate between Heidegger and Carnap on language and metaphysic s 
is emblematic of this split.' 
Because Win delband defend s the nomothetic (law-govern ed) foundations of the physi-
cal or natural sciences, and Dilthey defends the «independence" of the human sciences, 
1 Sec G reg Frost-Arnold. "'lhe Large-Scale Structure ofL ogic al Empiricism " (PhilosophyofSc1ence 
72 ( 5), 2005 ), 826- 38. 
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it is tempting to analyze the debate between Dilthey and Windclband as an earlier mani-
festation of the conflict between Carnap's and Neurath 's unity of science and Heidegger's 
and Gadamer's hermeneutics. This would be a mistake. Windclband was not defending 
the unity of science or of scientific language . Instead, he defended essential distinctions 
between types of science. Dilthey was not defending hermeneutics in the Heideggerian 
or Gadamerian sense. Rather, he was defending an earlier version more akin to that of 
Herder and, especially, Schleiermacher, the philosopher who had been the focus of most of 
Dilthey's early career . 
Finally, the debate between Dilthey and Windelband had less to do with the overcom-
ing of metaphysics than with the status of distinct types of science, and the relationships 
between them. This is partly due to Dilthey's and Windelband's own philosophical views, 
but it is also influenced strongly by the nineteenth century context. 
The nineteenth century saw a renewal of the German (then Prussian) university system, 
with the founding of the l:niversity of Berlin in 1810. Wilhelm von Humboldt, Fichte, and 
Schleiermacher saw the universities as dedicated to a particular ideal of Wissenschaft. The 
word usually is translated into English as "science ," but this does not capture the domain 
to which "Wissenschaft" was applied, especially in the early part of the nineteenth cen-
tury. As John Merz points out, "Fichte, whose whole doctrine was, according to French and 
English ideas, almost the reverse of scientific, uses the word Wissenschaftslehre to denote 
and characterize his system.''• Merz continues: 
In fact the German word for science has a much wider meaning than science has in French or 
English; 1t applies alike to all the studies which are cultivated under the roof of alma mater; 
it is an idea specially ev()lved out of the German university system, where theology, juris-
prudence, medicine, and the special philosophical studies are all said to be treated "scien-
tifically," and to form together the universal, all-embracing edifice of human knowledge 
(p.170). 
In its classic expression, Wissenschaft was a term for an intellectual endeavor shared by 
researchers at the university. The university faculties were intended, not as separate 
institutions with distinct specialties, but as departments of a single enterprise working 
cooperatively. 
The universities of Jena and of Berlin became well known for work that fell squarely 
within the classic ideal. In Berlin, the work of Leopold Ranke in history, Friedrich 
Schleiermacher in hermeneutics, and von Humboldt in history and in language exemplify 
the ideal of Wissenschaft as it was understood early in the nineteenth century. In Jena, the 
Romantic tradition associated with Goethe and Schelling, which blends research into nat-
ural science with humanistic inquiry, had its Blutezeit during the first half of the century. 
By the middle of the nineteenth century, the positivist and empiricist philosophies of 
Auguste Comte and John Stuart Mill had made their way into translation, and into dis-
cussions of scientific methodology . Closer to home, German materialism, spearheaded by 
Emil du Bois-Reymond, was in its prime in the 1850s and 186os. lhe broad definition of the 
word Wissenschaft came under increasing pressure throughout the nineteenth century. 
' John Theodore Merz, A History of European Thought in the Nineteenth Century, vol. 1. 
(Edinburgh: William Blackwood, 1907). 
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Merz traces this pressure to the increasing influence, in Germany, of the quite different 
French and British definitions of scientific research, along with the impressive progress 
made in the empirical and formal sciences over the nineteenth century. But there were also 
more philosophical pressures, coming from the materialist, empiricist, and positivist phil-
osophical traditions. 
Moreover, during this time, the faculties of philosophy expanded to include natural sci-
ences, including chemistry and physics.i Researchers in the philosophical and medical fac-
ulties did work in biology and in physiology. One of the greatest physiologists and physicists 
of the nineteenth century, Hermann von Helmholtz, was trained in the medical faculty. The 
ideal of the scientific researcher also underwent a change. Wilhelm von Humboldt's brother 
Alexander was a significant stimulus for this change, embarking on lengthy voyages of 
discovery and research into living and geological phenomena. '\Vhen Alexander returned 
from his voyages in the 1820s, he inspired others, including Johannes Muller, Ernst Haeckel, 
and even Charles Darwin, to take voyages of their own .• Humboldt, Muller, Haeckel, and 
Darwin clearly were engaging in scientific research . But, while all were academics, this 
research was not done within the university system, within the traditional Fakultiiten. 
Similarly, in 1845 Gustav Magnus formed a group that later became the Berlin Physical 
Society. Though Magnus was a professor at the University, the Berlin Physical Society was 
an independent research group, which met at Magnus's home and used his private laborato -
ries for scientific research . Later, Emil du Bois-Reymond and Werner von Siemens founded 
similar laboratories and research groups outside the university .' Freud and Helmholtz were 
among the talents who cut their teeth on this extra-university laboratory system. 
I concur with Reill, then, in arguing that we ought not to conceive of the narrative of the 
Geisteswissenschaften that emerged in the nineteenth century as a reaction to "Enlightenment 
scientism.' 11 The pressures were more immediate. Emil du Bois-Reymond, Eduard Zeller, and 
others gave famous lectures in which they advised that philosophy and history restrict them-
selves to the methods of the empirical, or natural , sciences. The universities at Berlin and at 
Jena were arenas of constant debate about the relative merits and methodologies of the empiri -
cal sciences and of the disciplines of philosophy, philology and linguistics, and history. 
Beginning in the 1830s and 1840s, an extraordinary group of scholars taught at the 
Friedrich-Wilhelms -Universitat, now the Humboldt-Universitat , in Berlin. These included 
Adolf Trendelenburg , Emil du Bois-Reym ond, and Heymann Steinthal, whose close asso-
ciate Moritz Lazarus would join him in the 1870s. Meanwhile, the university at Jena was 
the academic home of luminaries including Karl L. Reinhold, J. G. Fichte, G. \\'. F. Hegel, 
Friedrich W. J. Schelling, Wilhelm von Humboldt, and Friedrich von Schlegel. Later, Kuno 
Fischer and Gottlob Frege joined the faculty. The university at Jena fostered the beginnings 
of the Southwest School of neo-Kantiani sm to which Wilhelm Windelband belon ged, 
which later took root in Baden. 
3 See, for examp le, Margit Szollos i-Jan 1.e, MScience and Soc ial Space" (Minerva 43, 2005) , 339-60 . 
• Robert Richards, "Bwlogy," in From Natural Philosophy to the Sciences, ed . David Cahan 
(Chicago: lhe University of Chic ago Press. 2003), 17-18. 
s See, among others, Sven Dierig, Wissensclrnft in der Maschinenstadt (Gottlngen: Wallstein \ 'erlag. 
20~6), and Fr.an~ S~lloway, Freud: Biologist.of the Mind (Cambridge: Harvard University Pres s, 1992). 
Peter Reill, Science an d the Construction oft he Cu ltur a l Sciences in Late Enlightenment 
Germany" (History and 1heory 33 (3), 1994), p. 345 and passim. 
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In the 1830s, the topic of Erke1111tnistheorie, loosely translated as the theory of cogni-
tion, began to gain traction in the universities. Early works In the Erkenntnistheorie tra-
dition, including work by Georg Friedrich Benecke , Schleiermacher, and Reinhold, were 
broadly Kantian in approach.' Nonetheless, developments in the sciences, even in the 
,·ery early parts of the nineteenth century, put into question certain elements of Kant 's 
theory of the sciences. Kant's model for law-governed explanation in the natural sciences 
is ~ewtonian physics. In the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, Kant remarks 
that Kin every special doctrine of nature only so much science proper can be found as 
there is mathematics in it.''11 Using this criterion, Kant disqualifies biology and psychol-
ogy as proper sciences. Over the nineteenth century , biology and psychology proved to 
be particularly interesting cases. Materialism, positivism, and empiricism in philosophy 
and in science blended new advances in empirical psychology and in the physiology of 
perception with philosophical methods and analysis, in conceiving the basis for knowl-
edge of external phenomena. (Empirical psychology and physiology of perception were 
often indistinguishable during this period .) John Locke and David Hume had estab-
lished an early version of the "science of man" project, based on the desire to investigate 
the operation and limits of the human mind as a basis for the study of human knowl-
edge.P Hume turned the methods of natural science, especially observation and induc-
tion, on the human mind in endeavoring to become the "Newton of the mind ." 
At the end of the eighteenth century, in Kant's view, there was still no true Newton of 
the mind: no general mathematical laws for the association of impressions had been given. 
In the first half of the nineteenth century, work by Johann Friedrich Herbart, Wilhelm 
Wundt, and Gustav Theodor Fechner, among others, contributed to the founding of 
empirical psychology as a science demonstrably governed by, if not Newtonian laws, at 
least dynamic principles. As Herbart puts it: 
It is alleged .. . that mathematics treat only of quantities, whereas actions and states of greatly 
different qualities are the subject of psychology. [ ... ] It may be sufficient to assert that how-
ever great the number of fictitious qualities which a man may distinguish in his mind, he 
certainly cannot deny that over and above them there is an infinite variety of quantities 
determining mental action .'° 
Herbart argues that his laws aim to describe the quantitative variation of sensations and 
of thoughts, and their association and interaction with each other, in the same way that 
1'ewton's mechanics describes the interaction of material phenomena (pp. 253-4). 
Over the nineteenth century empirical psychologists and physiologists of sensation 
turned the methods of the empirical sciences on psychology , using obser vation to record 
responses to stimuli, as one would record the movement of an object in response to impact 
7 See Klaus Kohnke, The Rise of Neo-Kal'ltianism, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge 
Uni\'ersity Press, 1991), 361f. 
8 Immanuel Kant, Gesammelte Schriften, ed. Koniglich Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften 
(Berlin 19oof.), Ak. 4: 470 . 
9 John Locke,An Essay concerning Human Understanding, in The Works of John Locke, vol.1. 
(London: Henry G.13ohn, 1854 [16901), 132. 
'
0 Johann Herbart "Possibility and Necessity of Applying Mathematics in Psychology.~ trans. H. 
Haanel (Journal of Speculative Philosophy 11, 1877), 255. 
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in physics." In general, the nineteenth century saw the analysis of waves, whether of sound 
or of light, put on a rigorous mathematical foundation, which in turn allowed for unprec-
edented advances in the qualitative analysis of sensation . Kant's criterion that any true sci-
ence ought to be founded on mathematics now seemed to allow psychology, at least, to be 
treated as a proper science. 
There are several ways to interpret these developments, each with methodological con-
sequences . One approach is to question Kant's classification. If psychology has a mathe -
matical foundation similar to Newton's mechanics, then Kant's exclusion of psychology 
from the status of a true science is mistaken. Another possibility is to argue, as Hume had 
earlier, that the true methodological foundation even of Newton's science is inductiYe, 
not deductive, and to argue on these grounds for the methodological unity of psychol-
ogy and physics. This was the approach taken by John Stuart Mill (1806-73). ~till argues, 
in his System of Logic, for a set of rules of induction based on associationist psychology." 
Mill insists that not only associationist psychology, but also our account of scientific the-
ory building must restrict itself to claims that can be given a justification using the meth-
ods of the empirical sciences. His views on this score are one of the moti vations for the 
well-known debate between Mill and William Whewell (1794-1866). 
Even Millian and Humean associationism rely on ampliative inference, however. They 
allow for rules of association that have a broader validity than their original inductive 
basis. Another approach to psychology, in its relationship to epistemology, was to argue 
that psychology and physics both describe the properties and interaction of matter , and 
that all scientific explanation is in essence a description of material phenomena. This 
materialist position gained adherents In the mid-nineteenth century, with a particular 
flowering of German materialist works in the 1850s: Ludwig Buchner, Force and Material 
(1855), Jacob Moleschott, 171e Circulation of Life (1852), Carl Vogt, Superstition and Science 
(1855), and Heinrich Czolbe, The New Presentation of Sensualism (1855). These material· 
ist philosophers, many of whom were scientists, derived from psychology and the physi-
ology of perception the view that mental phenomena and physical phenomena both are 
manifestations of the properties of matter, so that there is no essential differ ence between 
them. The human sciences are equivalent to the natural science s: history and sociology 
are governed by natural laws, the same kind of natural laws as those governing the motion 
of the planets. 
30.3 THE GEISTESWISSENSCHAFTEN AND THE 
NATURWISSENSCHAFTEN 
.......... ................................ ........ ........................ ............ .... ........................................... ..... 
By the third quarter of the nineteenth century, materialism and positivism had made 
significant gains, especially in Germany and in Britain, The methods of the natural 
11 See, for example, Gary Hatfield , 1he Natural and the Normative (Cambridge, MA : MIT Press, 
1990), ch. 5. 
11 John Stuart Milt, A System of l.ogic, reprinted vols. 7-8 of Collected Works of John Stuart Mr/I, ed. 
J. Robson (Toronto: Univer sity of Toronto Press, 1963-91 [1843)). 
METHODOLOGY OF THE SCIENCES 599 
------- -- ----- -- - -
sciences had been refined as well, both in the domain of experiment, and in the formal, 
mathematical foundations of the sciences. The tradition of the Geisteswissenschaften is 
to defend the independence of a domain of questions from the resulting trend of appeal 
to the explanatory methods of the natural sciences as fundamental or even exhaustive. 
In his analy sis of the Geisteswissenschaften, Dilthey responds to what are seen as defects 
in both sides of the argument between materialism and idcalism. 1i Dilthey sees Hegelia n 
and Fichtean idealism as removing human agency from its natural environment into a 
noumenal or ideal realm, even though the material environment provid es the stimuli 
for, and materials for the implementation of, thoughts and ideas. On the other side, he 
saw materialist and positivist accounts of history and of sociology as lacking purchase 
on questions of meaning and culture that arc the particular subject matter of the human 
sciences. 
In response, Dilthey developed a theory of history influenced by the historian Johann 
Gustav Droysen (1808-84).' 4 In a series of articles and books in the 1850s and 1860s, 
Droysen responded to the British positivist historian Henry Thomas Buckle (1821-62), 
and to the growing influence of Mill, who had been introduced in German y and in 
translation since the 1840s (WDPH, p. 30). Buckle argues for determinism in human 
history, contending that human behavior is subject to the same laws as the weather 
or the motion of the planets, a position quite similar to that of the German material-
ists. Droysen responds by defending the independence of the methods of the historical 
sciences. 
In his Outline of the Principles of History of 1867, Droysen distinguishes between three 
methods of knowing. The method of philosophy is to know (erkennen); the method of his-
tory to understand (verstehen); and the method of science to explain (erkliiren). As Beiser 
(2012) draws from Droysen's lecture notes, these methods are distinguished as follows: "To 
know is to derive from first principles; to explain is to subsume under general mathe -
matical laws; and to understand is to interpret or translate, to make someone's meaning 
comprehensible to me by putting it in my own terms" (p. 298). Beiser points out that this 
typology anticipates Dilthey's own early analysis of understanding. According to Dilthey, 
the natural sciences explain (erkliiren), while the human sciences seek to understand (ver-
stehen).'' In his seminal Introduction to the Human Sciences of 1883, Dilthey introduces his 
own notion of understanding, which he conceives in response to the "historical school," 
to positivism, to the hermeneutic tradition, and to German Idealism. The historica l 
school, including Ranke and Droyscn, investigate the phenomena as they arise in histor y, 
and consider them to be constituted by human action and by context. Dilthey remarks 
that, while this tradition has been fruitful, it excludes "a link with the analysis of facts of 
•i For more background on Dilthey, see among others Rudolf Makkreel, "Wilhelm Dilthey," 
The Stanford [ncyclopedia of l'/11/osophy, ed. Edward Zalta , available at <http://plato.stanford.edu/ 
archives/sum 2012/entries/dilt hey/>, 2012. 
1
• Frederick Be1s~r. 1he German Historicist Tradition (Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University 
Press, 2011), 298 Further references to this text will be abbrevi ated GHT, followed by page number. 
Here see also William Kluback, Wilhelm Dilthey's Philosophy of History (~ew York, NY: Columbia 
University Press, 1956), ch. 1. Further references to this text will be abbreviated WDPH, followed by 
page number. 
15 See, for example, the essays in Uljana Feest ed., Historical Perspectives on Erklaren and Verste/ren 
(Dordrecht: Spnnger, 2009) . 
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consciousness." 16 The historical school analyzes the phenomena of human history exter-
nally, but does not examine the contribution of "epistemology (Erkennt11isthcorie] and 
psychology" to histor y. 
Dilth ey's basic argument for the independence of"understanding" is relatively simple. '; 
1. Particular events are not the analysanda of history. Rather, the aim of history is to 
put a given event or view into its context. In the case of an idea, this is studied as an 
expression of the individual, but where indi vidual expres sion is conditioned by: 
a. cultural and material conditions, and 
b. the categories of thought of the individual. 
2. The indiv idual's expression may become part of the cultural background, which in 
turn influences the ideas of others, which constitute new background categories. 
3. (la) can be studied profitably using the methods of the natural sciences. But (lb) 
and (2) cannot: 
a. (lb) requires inquiry into an individual's ide as, and 
b. (2) is an ongoing process that cannot be limited to a determinate space and 
time . 
Therefore , Dilthey concludes, the methods of the human sciences must be independent of 
the methods of the natural sciences . Understanding the categories of thought of an indi-
vidual requires interpreting her expressions as indications of her conceptual framew ork, 
that is, empl oying the methods of understanding. Moreover, the study of the influen ce of 
ideas and theories on others requires adopting a large-scale theory regarding the change 
of concepts and ideas over time. Neither of these are explicitly provided for by the meth-
ods of the natural sciences . 
A materialist may disagree with the premise (3a) for obvious reason s-for her, idea s are 
mate rial. Without an antecedent commitm ent to the notion th at ideas are independent of 
matter, (3a) is not a good argument for the independence of the huma n sciences from the 
natural sciences. 
But (3b) is more intrac table. It is not easy to see how the evolution of theories, and of 
conceptual frameworks in general, over time can be analyzed using the method s of the 
natural sciences. We might describe these methods pluralistically, as laboratory research, 
indu ctive generalizations, and causal inferenc es. These meth ods are not obviously adapted 
to investigating the relation ship between ideas and history. Any particular theory can be 
evaluated on the validit y of its inducti ve inferences or the accuracy of its predictions. But 
that will not allow us directly to evalu ate the influence of one theo ry or conceptua l frame-
work on anot her, for example. 
Dilthey maintain s that his analysis allows for a middle path between overestimating the 
particularity of individual ideas, and defending an overly idealist account of history. When 
Dilthey was at university, he had a close relationship with Moritz Lazarus and Heymann 
16 Wilhelm Dilthey, Introduction to the Human Sciences, vol. 1, tr. Ramon Betanzos (Detroit : \\'ayne 
State Univers ity Press, 1988 [1883}}, 72. Further references to this text will be abbreviated THS, followed 
by page numbe r. 
17 
'fhi s argument is not intended to be formally valid, of cour se. It is summ arized from Oilthey's 
account in IHS, ch. 3. See also WDf'H, p. 59. 
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Steinthal (WPDH, chs. 1-2; GHT, p. 343). While they were influenced by Herbartian psy-
chology, Lazarus and Steinthal object that Herbart neglects the historical, linguistic, and 
cultural dimensions of human existence and action. For an account of these, they turned 
to Humboldt and to Hegel, though in a critical spirit. Steinthal wrote a substantial mono-
graph, Wilhelm von Humboldt's Linguistics and the Hegelian Philosophy (1848), which com-
pares Humboldt to Hegel, and finds a middle path. In 1863, Lazarus gave a Rektoratsrede, 
"On Ideas in History," in which he also argues against accepting wholesale either Hegel's 
dialectic or Humboldt's humanism. 18 Lazarus argues that Hegel's thought removes the 
ideas too strictly from the material conditions of society, and thus it is unclear how we 
are to have access to them. Humboldt, on the other hand, argues that ideas have impact 
through the agency of individuals, who bring those ideas to fruition. But, Lazarus objects, 
individuals do not control the impact of their ideas on society, because they do not control 
material conditions, nor other individuals. Lazarus locates the contribution of reason to 
history in the influence of ideas on thoughts and actions, as these are made manifest in 
cultural artifacts and historical phenomena. Lazarus concludes that the only way to study 
ideas in history is to achieve a comprehensive perspective on an individual's thoughts and 
actions as they are revealed in history, so that one can reason from the cultural artifact to 
the idea behind it. 
In this context, Dilthey also appeals to the hermeneutic tradition, especially to Friedrich 
Schleiermacher (1768-1834) and Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803).19 ln his Ideas for the 
Philosophy of the History of Humanity (1784-91), Herder defends the thesis that thought 
depends on language. Language is an indication of thought; but thought is made possible 
by language in the first place. Herder faces the larger question of hm,v to interpret a text as 
a whole, as an expression of a given content , where this content may or may not be read 
as determined by authorial intention. Herder and Schleiermacher appeal to the notion of 
feeling or divination (Einfiihlimg), which Gjesdal parses as "attentiveness to the individu-
ality of symbolic expression as it lends voice to a larger cultural context.''>0 While Herder 
and Schleiermacher appeal to a notion of "divination" in their hermeneutic methods, they 
do not argue that the methods of the human sciences are di stinct from those of the natural 
sciences. As Beiser observes, Herder explicitly argues that the "laws that govern history are 
one and the same as those that govern nature" (GHT, p. 100). Herder's or Schleiermacher's 
interpreter uses Einfultlung as a way to investigate a text as evidence. 
Dilthey's relationship with Lazarus and Steinthal may explain Dilthey's similar com-
mitment to a distinct path between Humboldtian individualism and Hegelian idealism.11 
Dilthey also followed Lazarus, Steinthal, Herder, and Schleiermacher in locating the study 
of the individual, not in conceptual analysis or in empirical psychology alone, but in a 
" Moritz Lazarus, Ober d,e ldeen in der Geschichte (Berlin: Ferdinand Dumm le rs 
Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1865), 4m . 
19 See ~fichael N. Forster, "Hermeneutics,M in 1he Oxford Handbook of Continental Philosophy, ed. 
Michael Rosen and Brian Leiter (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) and ·tterder's Philosophy 
of Language, Interpretation, and TranslationM (Review of Metaphysics 56 (2), 2002), 323-56 for the 
background, motivations, and arguments of hermeneutic the ory in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. 
1° Kristin Gjesdal, ·Aesthetic and Political Humanism" (History of Philosophy Quarterly 24 (3), 
2007), 281. 
" For Dilthey's objections to their views, see Kluback, pp. 35-6. 
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holistic study of history, culture, language , and psychology. For Dilthey, the methodolog y 
for the human sciences is found in the entirety of human experience and culture: 
I compare every element of current abstract scientific thinking with the whole of human 
nature presented brexperience, the stud}' of language, and the study of history, and I look 
for their interrelationship (IHS, p. 73). 
Dilthey's strongest argument for the independ ence of the human sciences is based on th is 
holi sm. Dilthey does give individual arguments that specific results in the human sciences 
are based on intro spection or on hermeneutic methods . But he shies away from arguing 
that psychology or the analysis of introspective evidence yields a foundation for the human 
sciences (see also GHT. p. 3391f.). 
The holistic method rules out the approaches of earlier philosophers of experience. In 
my view, this is the right context in which to read Dilthey's famous remark that "There 
is no real blood flowing in the veins of the knowing subject fabricated by Locke, Hume , 
and Kant, but only the diluted juice of reason as mere mental activity" (GHT, p. 339ff.). For 
Dilthey, the human sciences aim, not at an analysis of consciou sness or of hi sto ry alone, 
but at a holistic understanding of the "totality of human nature," through study of the 
material and ideal facts of history and of culture (GHT, p. 339ff.). 
In founding the human sciences on a holist methodology, Dilthey returns to the earlier 
ideal of Wissenschaft as a cooperative endeavor. This ideal is distinct from the Kantian and 
neo-Kantian position, according to which the empirical and "historical" sciences are strictly 
separate from those sciences with an a priori foundation. Kant carefully distinguishes the two, 
for instance , in his essay "On the Conflict of the Faculties." Wilhelm Windelband (1848-1915), 
a key member of the Southwest School, defended the autonomy of philosophy, especially, from 
the methods of empirical science. He d id so in part in response to a well-known lecture of 1867 
by Eduard Zeller, «On the Meaning and Task of Phil osophy," in which Zeller argued that phi-
losophy should adopt the methods of the empirical sciences (see GHT, p. 375/f.). 
In his 1894 Rektoratsrede in Strasbourg, Windelband responds by upholding Kant's dis-
t inction between the methods of the rati onal and the empirical sciences. The rational sci-
ences are the a priori sciences, mathematics and philosophy; while the empirical sciences 
are those based on experience, such as biology and chemistry. Philosophy follows the critical 
method, which establishes the quid juris in Kant's sense, that is, the "reasons for knowled ge, 
the evidence for its validity"; whereas history follows the genetic method, which establishes 
the quid facti, th at is, the "causes of knowledge, how it originates from experience and the 
innate activity of the mind" (GHT, p. 376). Windclband reiterates Kant's Yiew th at the empiri-
cal sciences require "the verification of facts on the basis of observation," and the rational sci-
ences "are never based on single observations or collections of observati ons" (p. 173). 22 
What is new with Windclb and is the division of the methods of the empirical sciences 
into idiogr aphic and nomothetic: 
the empirical sciences either seek the general in the form of the law of nature or the particu -
lar in the form of the historically defined structure. On the one hand, they are concerned 
12 Wilhelm Windclband, KStrasbourg Rcctorial Address," trans. of"Geschichte und 
Naturwissenschaftcn" by Guy Oakes (History and Theory 19 (2), 1980 [1894)), 173. Further references to 
this text will be abbreviated GN, followed by page number. 
METHODOLOGY OF THE SCIENCES 603 
with the form which invariably remains constant. On the other hand, they are concerned 
with the unique, immanently defined content of the real event. ( ... ) scientific thought is 
nomotl,etic in the former case and idiograplric in the latter case (GN, p. 175). 
Xomothetic sciences aim to find general laws, while idiographic sciences focus on individ-
ual phenomena that may not be law-governed or exhibit regularities. Windelband defines 
idiographic sciences as those which seek "the particular in the form of the historically 
defined structure." On Windclband's account, then, history appears to be essentially idi-
ographic; and Dilthey's method of understanding is as well. 
Windclband begins his lecture by criticizing two nineteenth-century tendencies: on 
the one hand, to argue that philosophy is no longer a living discipline and is now only 
the history of philosophy; or, on the other hand, to place psychology at the foundation 
of the philosophical method (GN, p. 170). He is concerned to preserve the independ-
ence of the philosophical method from the methods of history and of psychology (GN, 
pp. 170-1). He continues by rejecting the division between the natural and the human 
sciences, observing that psychology itself is a problem case-it must be considered 
a "Geisteswissenschaft" or human science, since its subject is the human Geist, but its 
"methods are those of the natural sciences" (GN, p. 174). For these reasons, Windclband 
also criticizes Dilthey's theory of the human sciences, especially of history. Windelband 
argues that, while psychology may be as much a nomothetic science as is physics, history 
is a paradigmatically idiographic science. "Historically defined structures" are consti-
tuted by their particularity and individuality. 
On several significant points, Windelband and Dilthey were talking past each other. 
Windelband's aim in his Rektoratsrede is to make the true distinctions between sciences, 
and he argues that the division of sciences into Geistes- and Naturwissenschaften is incor-
rect. He goes on to say that the Geisteswissenschaften rely on a kind of «inner perception" 
or self-observation, described by Locke and by Descartes, that can no longer be relied upon 
as a foundation for scientific inquiry (GN, p. 173). However, Dilthey's approach does not 
necessarily rely on «inner perception." Rather, Dilthey employed a comparative approach, 
in which he brought the methods of history, of psychology, and of language together. 
Those methods could be entirely external and based on the analysis of empirical evidence 
through hypotheses, as are the hermeneutic methods of Herder and Schleiermacher. 
One way to read at least some of Dilthey's work is to observe that he was not necessar-
ily defending an essential division between types of science. Instead, he was defending his 
version of the Humboldtian ideal of Wissenschaft, as a collective endeavor to investigate not 
only knowledge, but also human experience and the meaning of human action in history. The 
method of understanding, and the application of hermeneutic and psychological methods in 
history and in the analysis of language, could solve questions about «the unity of life in the per-
son, the outer world, individuals apart from us, their life in time, and their influence on each 
other," which are: 
things we can explain from this totality of human nature( ... J It is not the assumption of a 
rigid a priori of our cognitive capacity, but only the history of development alone( ... ) which 
can answer the questions we all have to address to philosophy ([HS, p. 73). 
While Windelband focuses on classifying the sciences methodologically, Dilthey focuses 
on conceiving how researchers and intellectual pursuits can cooperate. 
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30.4 HISTORY AND METHODS 
................................ ............. ................................ ...............................  
Dilthey and Windelband are both opposed to materialism and positivism . But their 
responses are revealing about their antecedent philosophical commitments, and, per-
haps more significantly, about their views on the relationships between disc'.plines and 
research programs . From \Vindelband's perspective, materialism as an exhaustlw account 
of the sciences threatens the independent validity and normative force of the a priori sci-
ences. But Windelband does not see history itself as a true, nomothetic science; again, for 
Windelband, history is idiographic . 
This view of history was not shared universally in the nineteenth century. Hegel. of 
course, was opposed to it; in his Philosophy of History, he distinguishes first-hand reports 
from reflective and philosophical history as distinct levels of historical reasoning. While 
Marx argues against Hegel that the norms of history arc natural laws. not ideal relation -
ships, arguably, both Hegel and Marx would disagree with Windelband and argue that 
history can be nomothetic .13 
Windelband can agree that reasoning about historical relationships contributes to 
our understanding. But, in a Kantian spirit, he contends that such reasoning is not truly 
scientific. Instead , reasoning about the evolution of a concept or about the Zeitgeist, for 
instance, constitutes subjective reflections on our experience, which allow us to under-
stand our experience more fully. But such subjective forms of interpretation have no objec-
tive validity, that is, they ought not be applied to objects and to events as though they allow 
for judgments about objective reality. 
The debate between Windelband and Dilthey is reflected in at least two later discus-
sions of philosophy. in its relationship to the sciences . The first is raised by Windelband: 
the extent to which the search for law-governed relationships is not only central to, but 
definitiv e of. the methods of the natural sciences. Carl Hempel has defended perhaps the 
strongest position that the hypothetico -deductive method is chara cteristic of explanation 
in the natural sciences, which can be seen as an iteration ofW indclband 's view that nomo -
thetic explanations are characteristic of natural science. 2• However, distinguishing the 
hypothetico-deductive method from the inductive method requires making a clear distinc· 
tion between theoretical and observation statements. Rudolf Carnap, perhaps the strongest 
defender of such a distinction in his earlier work, comes to a much more conYentionalist 
view by mid-twentieth century, when he writes "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology." 
In general, the debates between Carn ap and Quine over the relationship of language to 
scientific inference, over semantics ,•ersus syntax in evaluating scientific theori es and lin-
guistic frameworks, and especially over the use of inductive versus deductive methods in 
constructing scientific theories, can be read as a further development of debates over the 
proper methods of theory construction and evaluation in the natural sciences. Hernpel's 
view on nomothctic explanation further is put to the test by recent work on the importance 
'
3 See, for example, John Stanle y, "Mar x's Critique of Hegel 's Phil o~ophyof Nature" (Science and 
Society 61 (4), 1997), 449-73, 
'
4 C~rl Hem~el , "Aspect s ~fScientific Explanation,'' in Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other 
Essays m the Philosophy of Science (New York: Free Pres s, 1965). 
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of scientific understanding, which addresses the question of how to carve theories into ele-
ments that contribute to explanation versus understanding of the phenomena in question. 1s 
Moreo,·er, dividing the natural from the human sciences may make it appear that natural 
science makes no attempt to give an interpretation, not just a phenomenal description, of 
nature . But it is a vexed question now, as it was in the nineteenth century, what relation ship 
there is between the mathematical or more purely theoretical statements, even of physical 
theories, and their interpretation. Can theories, like nature, be carved at the joints , to show 
which elements are justificatory, which explanatory, and which contribute to understanding? 
A second, less often addressed, question is raised by Dilthey's work. The question con-
cerns the interrelationship between scientific theories and pursuits, where history , psy-
chology, and theory oflanguage are taken to be scientific. In the sciences themselves, the 
scope of contemporary research projects, in which no one person can complete a given 
project, and scientists of various kinds of training and background must cooperate, has 
provoked discussion of how this fact affects the practice and the epistemology of sci-
ence. A clearly conceived ideal of a common methodology. or at least of common aims 
and practices, might resolve problems encountered by cooperative intellectual enterprises. 
Dilthey's own work probably does not succeed in articulating such an ideal, but should be 
valued for its appreciation of the importance of cooperation in the methods of the sciences . 
Moreover, Dilthey 's notion of the Geisteswissenschaften reflects the earlier concept of 
Wissenschaft as a shared , cooperative research program. The development of a separate 
discipline of the history and philosophy of science in the twentieth century provokes the 
question of how the methods of history are used in philosophy by philosophers, of how 
historians and philosophers of science might work together, and of what common aims 
the two "faculties" might have. Thomas Kuhn, who had much in common with Dilthey, 
was trained as a physicist, and engaged in the history of science without historical train-
ing. While his work has had a seminal influence on philosophy of science and, especiall y, 
history and philosophy of science, it does not contain very many more general recom-
mendations about how to blend the two methodologies. Not enough work has been done 
to explain the foundations and methods proper to a philosophical history, or a historical 
philosophy, of science. Dilthey's account, especially in chapter 3 of !HS, gives a number of 
recommendations and insights that are worth considering in taking on such a project. '6 
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